

## Message Text

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W  
-----076051 011241Z /11  
O 011202Z APR 78 ZFF-6  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2326  
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE  
WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 TEL AVIV 4394

EXDIS DIST AS NODIS

E.O.11652: GDS  
TAGS: PBOR, PEPR, IS, US, EG  
SUBJ: CODEL JAVITS--SENATOR JAVITS' MEETINGS WITH KEY ISRAELI  
LEADERS CONCERNING NEXT STEPS IN THE PEACE PROCESS

1. SENATOR JAVITS AND HIS ASSISTANT, ALBERT LAKELAND, VISITED ISRAEL FROM SUNDAY AFTERNOON, MARCH 26, THROUGH TUESDAY AFTERNOON, MARCH 28, ON A POLITICAL FACT-FINDING AND "ASSESSMENT" MISSION. THEY MET SEPARATELY WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, DEFENSE MINISTER WEIZMAN, FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN, OPPOSITION LEADER SHIMON PERES, AG MINISTER SHARON, FORMER FOREIGN MINISTERS ABBA EBAN AND YIGAL ALLON, AND FINANCE MINISTER SIMCHA EHRLICH. I ACCOMPANIED JAVITS TO MEETINGS WITH BEGIN AND WEIZMAN AND HOSTED AN INFORMAL STAG WORKING DINNER FOR HIM WITH SPECTRUM OF ISRAELI POLITICAL SCENE REPRESENTED. ISRAELI GUESTS INCLUDED MINISTER OF JUSTICE TAMIR(DMC), CHAIRMAN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE KNESSET, MOSHE ARENS (HERUT), MK YEHUDA BEN-MEIR (NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY). OPPOSITION WAS REPRESENTED BY ABBA EBAN, YIGAL ALLON, AND YITZHAK NAVON--ABOUT TO BECOME NEXT PRESIDENT OF ISRAEL AND FORMER CHAIRMAN OF KNESSET FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. JAVITS GAVE PRESS CONFERENCE  
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AT AIRPORT BEFORE LEAVING, TEXT OF WHICH IS CONTAINED IN TEL AVIV 4206.

2. TO ALL ISRAELIS WITH WHOM HE SPOKE, JAVITS CONVEYED DEEP SENSE OF CONCERN ABOUT CURRENT STATE OF U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE, UNLESS BEGIN GOVERNMENT MODIFIED SOME OF ITS POSITIONS--PARTICULARLY WITH

RESPECT TO INTERPRETATION OF SC RESOLUTION 242. HE DEPICTED STATE OF AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AS DECREASINGLY FAVORABLE TO ISRAELI POSITION, AND DESCRIBED GRAPHICALLY WIDESPREAD WORRIES AMONG FRIENDS OF ISRAEL IN CONGRESS, ESPECIALLY ABOUT RECENT ISRAELI ACTIONS ON SETTLEMENTS FIELD AND ON 242 INTERPRETATION. HE MADE CLEAR THAT HE WAS HERE AS A SENATOR OF THE UNITED STATES WHO HAD LONG AND ENERGETICALLY SUPPORTED ISRAEL, BUT WHO HIMSELF WAS DEEPLY DISTURBED ABOUT SOME OF THE RECENT TRENDS. HE TOLD BEGIN AND SOME OF THE OTHERS THAT HE HAD SPOKEN AT LENGTH WITH PRESIDENT CARTER BEFORE LEAVING WASHINGTON, AND THAT HE UNDERSTOOD AND SYMPATHIZED WITH MANY OF THE PRESIDENT'S CURRENT WORRIES ABOUT THE ISRAELI POSITION IN THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. IN THE MEETING WITH BEGIN, JAVITS TALKED PASSIONATELY AND PERSUASIVELY FOR ALMOST 40 MINUTES ABOUT THE STATE OF U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS IN THE WAKE OF THE BEGIN VISIT TO WASHINGTON, AND ABOUT VERY WIDESPREAD WORRIES ABOUT ISRAELI POLICY ON SETTLEMENTS AND 242 WHICH HE WANTED TO BE SURE BEGIN PERCEIVED ACCURATELY. HE TOLD BEGIN THAT ONE SHOULD NOT OVERESTIMATE THE ERROSION OF ISRAEL'S SUPPORT IN THE CONGRESS. HE BELIEVES THAT ISRAEL STILL CAN COMMAND TWO-THIRDS SUPPORT IN EACH HOUSE ON IMPORTANT ISSUES, BUT HE STRESSED THAT MANY OF THOSE SUPPORTERS ARE VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE DIRECTION OF EVENTS. JAVITS SAID HE CONFIDENTIAL

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BELIEVED THAT SADAT HAS ADLPTED AN OVERRIDING GOAL OF TRYING TO SPLIT ISRAEL FROM ITS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT SOME OF THE RECENT ISRAELI ACTIONS WERE PLAYING DIRECTLY INTO HIS HANDS. HE PUT EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO PRESERVE AND TEND THE SPECIAL U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP AS OVERRIDING EVERY OTHER ASPECT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE.

4. JAVITS CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION TO BEGIN WITH THE FOLLOWING THREE RECOMMENDATIONS TO DEAL WITH THE CURRENT IMPASSE:

A. ALLOW SOME TIME TO PASS FOR SERIOUS RETHINKING AND REFLECTION BEFORE TAKING NEW INITIATIVES;

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WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

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B. FIND SOME WAY TO RESOLVE THE 242 INTERPRETATION  
ISSUE TO THE SATISFACTION OF PRESIDENT CARTER AND ISRAEL'S  
AMERICAN SUPPORTERS; AND  
C. MAKE THE NECESSARY HARD DECISIONS TO COMPLETE THE  
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES IN ORDER TO GET A REAL NEGOTIATING  
PROCESS GOING AGAIN.  
HE THEN ELABORATED A PROCEDURAL IDEA, WHICH HE ALSO DISCUSSED  
WITH A NUMBER OF OTHERS AND WITH THE PRESS: AS A WAY TO  
USE PRODUCTIVELY THE "TIME FOR REFLECTION," THAT A "JOINT  
COMMISSION" BE SET UP TO EXAMINE CAREFULLY PRESIDENT  
CARTER'S "SIX NO'S," I.E., THE SIX NEGATIVE CONCLUSIONS  
WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD DRAWN ABOUT THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATING  
POSITIONS AT THE END OF HIS WASHINGTON MEETINGS. JAVITS  
ARGUED THAT THESE "SIX NO'S" HAD TO BE EXAMINED CAREFULLY  
IN LIGHT OF THE AMERICAN POSITIONS ON THE ISSUES TO SEE  
IF INDEED THEY WERE AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF THE ISRAELI  
CASE. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE COMMISSION BE COMPOSED OF  
FOREIGN MINISTER DAYAN AND SECRETARY VANCE PLUS PERHAPS  
ATTORNEY GENERAL BARAK AND A PROMINENT KNESSET MEMBER ON  
THE ISRAELI SIDE AND AN AMERICAN LEGAL EXPERT PLUS A  
MEMBER OF THE U.S. SENATE ON THE AMERICAN SIDE (\*). HE  
ARGUED THAT A CAREFUL, DISPASSIONATE APPROACH TOWARD  
ANALYZING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AND THE  
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ISRAELI POSITIONS WOULD PROVIDE A NECESSARY BREATHING  
SPELL TO ALLOW BOTH SIDES TO THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT THE  
DIRECTION THEIR POLICIES WERE LEADING. ALTHOUGH JAVITS  
DID NOT SAY SO SPECIFICALLY, HE IMPLIED TO BEGIN THAT  
THIS IDEA MIGHT ALREADY HAVE SOME ENDORSEMENT BY THE  
PRESIDENT, AND HE TOLD BEGIN HE WOULD BE SEEING PRESIDENT  
CARTER AS SOON AS HE RETURNED TO WASHINGTON TO REPORT  
ON THEIR DISCUSSIONS.

5. BEGIN'S RESPONSES TO JAVITS WERE LISTLESS AND DIS-APPOINTING. HE REMAINED THROUGHOUT THEIR CONVERSATION MIRED IN HIS FEELINGS OF BEING UNFAIRLY TREATED BY THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION AND PUT REPEATEDLY THE QUESTION WHY HIS PEACE PLAN WAS NO LONGER WELL VIEWED BY THE U.S. (JAVITS ANSWERED FRANKLY THAT IT WAS BECAUSE GOI STATEMENTS AND ACTIONS HAD LOST CREDIBILITY IN THE U.S. AS A RESULT OF THE SETTLEMENTS ACTIVITY AND THE SWITCH OF POSITIONS ON 242.) BEGIN DID NOT REJECT JAVITS' "JOINT COMMISSION" IDEA, NOR DID HE LEAP AT IT. HE WARNED JAVITS PLAINTIVELY THAT "AMERICA MUST NOT PUSH US TO THE WALL." HE SAID THAT TO CHARACTERIZE THE ISRAELI PEACE PLAN AS "SIX NO'S" "WAS NOT A PROPER WAY TO ACT," AND THAT ANY "JOINT COMMITTEE" SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT START WITH AN EXAMINATION OF THOSE "SO-CALLED SIX NO'S." IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, BEGIN SAID, THERE ARE CONCRETE AMERICAN PEACE PROPOSALS TO DISCUSS, THEN SUCH A COMMISSION MIGHT BE WORTHWHILE. JAVITS MEETING WITH BEGIN ENDED ON A NOTE OF CONSIDERABLE DISCOURAGEMENT ON BOTH SIDES. IT WAS A FRANK AND OFTEN EMOTIONAL EXCHANGE BETWEEN OLD FRIENDS, BUT IT DID NOT REVEAL ANY EVIDENCE THAT BEGIN WAS ABLE AT THIS POINT TO REASSESS ANY OF HIS POSITIONS.

6. THE MEETINGS WITH THE OTHER ISRAELI LEADERS WERE  
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PRIMARILY SIGNIFICANT FOR THE FACT THAT JAVITS GAVE A VERY GLOOMY AND FRANK ANALYSIS TO EACH OF THEM FROM HIS PERSPECTIVE OF THE STATE OF U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS. WITH THE GROUP ASSEMBLED AT MY DINNER, HE TALKED STRAIGHT AS ONE POLITICIAN TO OTHERS ABOUT THE NEED TO DEAL POLITICALLY RATHER THAN EMOTIONALLY WITH THEIR DILEMMAS. HE MADE A SUBSTANTIAL IMPRESSION ON SEVERAL OF THEM.

7. IN HIS COMMENTS TO HIS INTERLOCUTORS ON THE ARMS PACKAGE, JAVITS SPOKE CONVINCINGLY THAT THE SENATE WILL APPROVE A MODIFIED PACKAGE WHICH WILL INCLUDE SOME, IF NOT ALL, OF THE F-15'S PROPOSED FOR SAUDI ARABIA. HE FORECAST THAT A DEAL WOULD EVENTUALLY BE WORKED OUT WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CHANGES IN NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT, DELIVERY DATES, DEPLOYMENT PLANS, AND/OR POSSIBLY "DIFFERENT MODELS." THE RESULT WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE PRESENT ARMS BALANCE IN THE REGION. BUT HE LEFT HIS LISTENERS IN NO DOUBT THAT BOTH THE SAUDIS AND THE EGYPTIANS WOULD RECEIVE ADVANCED AIRCRAFT, AND THAT HE SUPPORTS THE ADMINISTRATION'S CONCEPT OF A PACKAGE DEAL.

8. WITH WEIZMAN THE CONVERSATION WENT ALONG FAMILIAR LINES IN WHICH WEIZMAN ARGUED THAT THE U.S. UNDERESTIMATED

THE MAGNITUDE OF BEGIN'S CHANGE OF POSITIONS ON BOTH SINAI AND THE WEST BANK, WHILE JAVITS PROBED MORE THAN PREACHED TO SEE HOW MUCH GIVE MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IN THE PRESENT ISRAELI POSITIONS. WEIZMAN MADE VERY CLEAR THAT U.S. PRESSURE WOULD NOT FORCE THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT TO SUCCUMB, AND JAVITS SAID HE ALSO BELIEVED THAT TO BE TRUE, "UNLIKE MANY OF HIS FRIENDS." WEIZMAN STRESSED HIS WORRY THAT IF NEGOTIATIONS REMAINED STALLED UNTIL OCTOBER THAT REAL TROUBLE COULD OCCUR. HE SAID HE KNEW THAT SADAT IS CONVINCED THAT THE SINAI ACCORDS EXPIRE IN OCTOBER, EVEN THOUGH THEY DO NOT--AND THAT HE MIGHT EVEN

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ASK THE UN TO LEAVE IN A REPETITION OF 1967. WEIZMAN ASKED JAVITS WHETHER THE U.S. WOULD "PRESSURE SADAT TO KEEP A UN FORCE IN SINAI AS YOU ARE NOW PRESSURING US ON 242." JAVITS SAID HE DEFINITELY THOUGHT THAT WE WOULD DO SO IN THAT EVENTUALITY. WEIZMAN CONFIRMED TO JAVITS THAT "WE WISHED TO GET OUT OF LEBANON AS SOON AS POSSIBLE," BUT HE STRESSED THAT A UNILATERAL CEASEFIRE CARRIED OUT ONLY BY THE ISRAELIS COULD NOT LONG ENDURE.

9. SUMMING UP, SENATOR JAVITS' RAPID VISIT HERE WAS AN IMPRESSIVE PERFORMANCE IN EVERY RESPECT. HIS COMMENTS WERE A REAL DASH OF COLD WATER FOR A NUMBER OF THOSE WHO HEARD HIM, AND WITH BEGIN HE MADE AN EXTRA-ORDINARY EFFORT TO GET BEGIN THINKING POLITICALLY INSTEAD OF EMOTIONALLY ABOUT THE CURRENT IMPASSE. UNFORTUNATELY, I DO NOT BELIEVE HE SUCCEEDED, ALTHOUGH BEGIN FREQUENTLY REFLECTS LATER ON THINGS SAID TO HIM TO WHICH HE DOES NOT REACT AT THE MOMENT. WHEN I SAW BEGIN WITH ANOTHER

VISITOR THE NEXT DAY, HE WAS TURNING OVER IN HIS MIND  
SENATOR JAVITS' PROPOSAL ABOUT THE "JOINT U.S.-ISRAELI  
COMMITTEE." HE OBVIOUSLY IS THINKING OF IT AS A  
WAY TO DEVELOP AN AGREED U.S.-ISRAELI PEACE PROPOSAL  
TO PRESENT TO THE EGYPTIANS. I TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO  
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TRY TO DIRECT HIM AWAY FROM THIS LINE OF THINKING,  
POINTING OUT THAT ANY SUCH PROCEDURE IS BOUND TO FAIL  
WITH THE EGYPTIANS, AND RECALLED THE UNHAPPY RESULT OF  
THE "U.S.-ISRAELI WORKING PAPER" LAST AUTUMN. HE  
SEEMED TO TAKE THE POINT.

10. SENATOR JAVITS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE DISCUSSING HIS  
IMPRESSIONS OF BEGIN AND ISRAEL WITH PRESIDENT CARTER  
NEXT WEEK. I ANTICIPATE THAT HE WILL PUSH THE "JOINT  
COMMITTEE" IDEA A A WAY TO TRY TO SMOOTH OVER THE  
WIDENING GAP BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES.  
LEWIS

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## Message Attributes

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